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Introduction
In a recent article in this Journal, Forgey, Rutherford and VanBuskirk (1994) (hereafter
FRV) analyzed the sales price of foreclosed properties in Arlington, Texas. They found
‘‘that foreclosed properties sold at a 23% discount.’’ This finding flies in the face of both
the efficient market hypothesis and previous evidence that residential markets are
relatively efficient (see Gau, 1984, 1985; Johnson and Kaserman, 1983; Shilling, 1990).
To see why this is so, consider that the seller in a foreclosed property is usually a
financial institution or government agency, such as the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD). There is no reason to suspect, a priori, that the selling price
of a property will be affected by who the seller may be. A 23% discount should afford
ample opportunities to make excess profits, even after transaction costs, by trading in
such properties. In the extreme, imagine buying a property at a 23% discount because it
is foreclosed and then selling it without any repairs whatsoever the next day under
nonforeclosed status. Are we to believe there will be a 23% appreciation in this short
period?
We suggest that foreclosed properties sell at a discount because of the condition of the
property itself, the condition of the neighborhood within which the property lies, or
both.1 If this is the case, then the findings of FRV result from a failure to adequately
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Abstract. In this comment we examine the conclusion by Forgey, Rutherford and
VanBuskirk (1994) ‘‘that the foreclosed properties sold at a 23% discount,’’ using a sample
of nearly 2,000 residential property sales from the Las Vagas, Nevada area. We found that
when not controlling for location with a set of dummy variables for zip codes, HUD
foreclosed properties sold for between 12.18% and 13.96% below a random sample of
properties not within one block of foreclosed properties. When controlling for location,
using a set of thirty-one dummy variables for zip codes, the foreclosure discount fell to
between 8.45% and 9.72%. When controlling for the common characteristics between
foreclosed properties and their neighbors, we found foreclosure discounts are very small
(between .17% and 2.58%) and no longer statistically significant. We conclude that
foreclosure does not provide an opportunity for arbitrage profits, and this study does
reinforce the findings of other studies that conclude real estate markets operate efficiently.
control for the condition of the property or the condition of the neighborhood. We
submit that the variables used to control for neighborhood quality in the FRV study are
inadequate for this purpose for several reasons and suggest other methods. Below we
offer reasons for the inadequacy of FRV’s control variables.
In this paper we test for market efficiency by first replicating FVR’s model with data
from Las Vegas, Nevada, and then, using this same data, control for the effects of the
neighborhood conditions with different control variables. We replicate FRV’s findings
when we do not control for the effects of neighborhood quality. However, contrary to
their results, we find that the discount for foreclosed properties is much less when
neighborhood effects are adequately controlled. The actual discount because of
foreclosure status is well within the range of transactions costs, suggesting that the
market for residential properties is efficient.
In this next section we discuss an alternative control technique to that of FRV. In the
following section we discuss the data and empirical results and follow with a concluding
section.
Controlling for Neighborhood Quality
Any model designed to isolate the effect of an independent variable on a dependent
variable must adequately control for the effects of other independent variables.2 We
believe FRV fail to do so in their model of foreclosure effects on selling prices. They use
three control variables: ZIP, MAPSCO and AREA. ZIP is the numerical value of one
of approximately fourteen zip codes within Arlington, Texas. MAPSCO represents
numerous small area numbers designed for mapping purposes, and AREA represents
about thirteen area numbers assigned by the local multiple listing service (MLS). None
of these location variables were designed to capture neighborhood effects, although the
smaller segments may begin to capture neighborhood effects by chance. Further, FRV
enter these variables as cardinal variables and not as nominal variables. Since zip codes
are merely numbers assigned arbitrarily to postal service districts, treating zip as a
cardinal number is a serious flaw in their analysis. Two of the three variables contain
insignificant signs and for all three their coefficients cannot be interpreted. In our
model we treat the thirty-two zip codes in the Las Vegas area as qualitative distinctions
by using a set of thirty-one dummy variables. We show that the magnitude of the
‘‘foreclosure effect’’ is sensitive to the correct treatment of zip codes as nominal
variables.
To control for the quality of neighborhood one should select a control group of non-
foreclosed properties from as close a proximity to the foreclosed properties as possible.
Such a selection avoids the use of arbitrary boundaries represented by areas such as zip
codes or real estate map coordinates. In our model, we select two control groups: non-
foreclosed properties within one block of each foreclosed property, and a random
sample of properties not located near foreclosure properties. We test the robustness of
the FRV model by first treating foreclosures and neighborhood sales as distinct groups,
that is, with nonoverlapping indicator variables. We then recode the neighborhood
indicators to include foreclosed properties, since these properties are obviously in their
own neighborhoods. This recoding allows us to distinguish between location and
foreclosure effects. 
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Data
Our sample consists of 1,974 residential properties sold in the Las Vegas Valley between
1990 and 1993. Of these properties, 385 were sold by HUD and 19 were sold by private
financial institutions after being foreclosed. We consider both HUD- and bank-
foreclosed properties separately to further investigate any difference in selling price
between these types. To control for neighborhood effects we included properties within
one block of each foreclosed property; our sample contains 931 (47% of the sample) in
close proximity to HUD-foreclosed properties and 38 (2%) situated nearby bank-
foreclosed properties. Such close proximity of the non-foreclosed properties to the
foreclosed houses will control for neighborhood effect much better than arbitrary
boundaries such as zip codes. The remainder of the sample consists of 602 properties not
within a block of foreclosed properties. All data were selected from Microscan, a database
containing 319,451 properties including 196,000 single-family residence sales in Clark
County, Nevada. A summary of the data is presented in Exhibit 1.
The average price of houses in our sample was $88,268 ($65,640 in 1982–1984 dollars)
and the average age was 15.74 years. The average house also had 1.87 baths and 3.08
bedrooms. The typical house had one story and the overwhelming majority had an
attached garage. The average prevailing mortgage interest rate was 8.89%3 and a typical
house had 1,485 square feet. Thirteen percent of the residences had swimming pools and
11.55% were built on slab foundations.
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Exhibit 1
Descriptive Statistics
Mean Median Std Dev. Maximum Minimum Observs.
PRICE $88,268 $81,000 $45,941 $750,000 $10,074 1974
RPRICE $65,640 $60,030 $34,158 $552,690 $7,175 1974 
AGE 15.74 13 12.1933 58 0 1974
BATH 1.87 1.75 0.4953 6 0.75 1974
BEDROOM 3.08 3 0.7481 8 1 1974
FIREPLACE 0.57 1.00 0.60 4 0 1974
FLOORS 1.24 1 0.4281 2 1 1974
GARAGE 0.98 1 0.6862 3 0 1974
MRATE 8.89 8.94 1.0724 10.48 6.8 1974
SQFT 1485.50 1350 532.875 8235 603 1974
POOL 13.12% 0 33.77% 1 0 1974
SLAB 11.55% 0 31.97% 1 0 1974
BANK .96% 0 9.77% 1 0 1974
BANKNAB 1.93% 0 13.74% 1 0 1974
HUD 19.45% 0 39.59% 1 0 1974
HUDNAB 47.16% 0 49.93% 1 0 1974
BANKNAB2 2.89% 0 16.75% 1 0 1974
HUDNAB2 66.67% 1 47.15% 1 0 1974
The Model and Empirical Results
In an attempt to replicate the findings of FRV we fit the following linear and log-linear
models:
RPRICE5f(AGE,BATH,BR,FP,FL,GAR,MR,SQFT,
POOL,SLAB,ZIP,BANK,BANKNAB,HUD,HUDNAB) (1)
ln(RPRICE)5g(AGE,BATH,BR,FP,FL,GAR,MR,ln(SQFT),
POOL,SLAB,ZIP,BANK,BANKNAB,HUD,HUDNAB) , (2)
where:
SP 5 sales price of residential property, deflated by consumer price index for
housing (1982–845100);4
AGE 5 age of the property in years;
BATH 5 number of bathrooms;
BR 5 number of bedrooms;
FP 5 number of fireplaces;
FL 5 number of floors (stories) in the house;
GAR 5 1 if house has garage, 0 otherwise;
MR 5 prevailing mortgage interest rate the month the property was sold;
SQFT 5 total square foot in building (measured as natural logarithm in log-
linear regression5);
POOL 5 1 if house has pool, 0 otherwise;
SLAB 5 1 if foundation is slab, 0 otherwise;
ZIP 5 a set of thirty-one dummy variables for different zip codes in the Las
Vegas Valley;
BANK 5 1 if foreclosure sale by commercial bank;
BANKNAB 5 1 if property is within one block6 of bank-foreclosed property;
HUD 5 1 if foreclosure sale by U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development;
HUDNAB 5 neighbor of HUD foreclosure.
Equations (1) and (2) are modified to account for the fact that BANK-foreclosed
properties (BANK51) and HUD-foreclosed properties (HUD51) are located in their
own neighborhood. As equations (1) and (2) are written, one cannot tell whether the
coefficient on BANK reflects bank foreclosures or the effect of hidden neighborhood
characteristics. Similarly, one cannot determine whether the coefficient on HUD reflects
the effect of HUD foreclosures or the effects of hidden neighborhood characteristics.
Clearly neighborhood indicator variables should be recoded to include both foreclosed
properties and non-foreclosed properties in the same neighborhood.
We mitigate this problem by replacing the neighborhood dummy variables in equations
(1) and (2) with new variables coded as follows:
BANKNAB25BANKNAB1BANK.7 That is, BANKNAB is coded as 1 for both bank
foreclosures and neighboring non-foreclosed properties. This allows us to interpret the
coefficient on BANK as measuring the effect of foreclosure independent of neighborhood
effects.
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HUDNAB25HUDNAB1HUD. As explained above, this means that the coefficient on
HUD measures the foreclosure effect independent of neighborhood characteristics. Our
revised equations become:
RPRICE5f(AGE,BATH,BR,FP,FL,GAR,MR,SQFT,
POOL,SLAB,ZIP,BANK,BANKNAB2,HUD,HUDNAB2) ; (1a)
ln(RPRICE)5f(AGE,BATH,BR,FP,FL,GAR,MR,ln(SQFT),
POOL,SLAB,ZIP,BANK,BANKNAB2,HUD,HUDNAB2 . (2a)
Exhibit 2 presents the linear and log-linear regressions for the sample of 1,974 houses,
wherein the indicator variables for foreclosed properties (HUD and BANK) are treated as
mutually exclusive relative to the indicator variables for close neighbors of foreclosed
properties (HUDNAB and BANKNAB).
The results are also presented with and without the inclusion of a set of thirty-one
dummy variables for zip codes in the Las Vegas Valley. The individual coefficients and 
t-statistics for the coefficients for the zip code indicators are not reported for brevity and
the collective significance of those indicators is evaluated with the use of an F-statistic.8
In the linear equation, all coefficients are statistically significant at the .01 level except
for the indicator variables for slab construction, bank-foreclosed properties, and neighbors
of bank-foreclosed properties. Adding the zip code indicators yields a statistically
significant improvement in the adjusted R2 and generally reduces the t-statistics for the
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Exhibit 2
Regressions: Foreclosures and Neighborhood Properties Separate
Linear Regressions Log-Linear Regressions
Dependent Variable: RPRICE Dependent Variable: ln (RPRICE)
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Coeff. T-Stat. Coeff. T-Stat. Coeff. T-Stat.
Intercept 6873.81 1.40 23344.87 2.17 6.6517 24.12 7.1711 17.58
AGE 2547.96 211.75 2393.45 27.13 2.0097 213.05 2.0068 27.89
BATH 4462.17 2.98 4167.86 2.78 .0812 3.41 .0605 2.59
BR 26250.33 28.41 25007.35 26.65 2.0572 24.63 2.0258 22.08
FP 6183.21 6.39 5565.08 5.76 .1272 8.12 .1065 6.95
FL 25325.46 24.26 25309.21 24.30 2.0537 22.69 2.0568 22.92
GAR 3634.53 5.26 3322.45 4.92 .0346 3.10 .0248 2.32
MR 2582.03 6.11 2672.10 6.53 .0417 6.19 .0422 6.58
SQFT* 39.75 28.43 36.89 26.17 .5745 13.83 .4788 11.59
POOL 9608.02 6.66 9415.94 6.67 .1526 6.66 .1338 6.07
SLAB 2675.72 2.47 2739.73 2.53 2.0212 2.92 2.0281 21.28
BANK 22256.43 2.48 21750.56 2.38 2.0306 .41 .0596 .83
BANKNAB 25734.41 21.70 27421.88 22.19 2.0873 21.62 2.0867 21.63
HUD 29026.51 26.47 26280.68 24.56 2.1299 25.85 2.0883 24.09
HUDNAB 27325.57 26.40 24590.51 24.01 2.1228 26.74 2.0867 24.84
ZIP F 5 6.44 F 5 8.81
R2 .6588 .6908 .5325 .5905
Adjusted R2 .6564 .6836 .5292 .5810
F-statistic 270.20 95.74 159.40 61.79
Observations 1974 1974 1974 1974
*SQFT entered as natural logarithm in log-linear equation
housing characteristics. The exception in the linear equation is that the addition of zip
code indicators renders the indicator for bank neighbors (but not bank-foreclosed
properties) statistically significant at the .05 level. Even with zip code indicators, the
indicators for HUD foreclosures and HUD neighbors are both statistically significant.
Furthermore, the results are similar to those found by FRV. It must be mentioned,
however, that the results so far do not indicate whether HUD properties sell at significantly
less than other properties because of foreclosure per se or because of their location.
In the log-linear equation we find much the same results. All of the variables are
statistically significant except for the indicators for slab construction, bank foreclosures,
and neighbors of bank foreclosures. HUD foreclosures appear to sell for 12.18% less, and
HUD neighbors sell for 11.56% less than houses not located near foreclosed properties.
Introducing the set of zip code dummies reduces the discount on HUD properties to
8.45% and the markdown on HUD neighbors to 8.3%. Again, it is unclear from Exhibit
2 whether HUD properties sell for less because of their foreclosure status or because of
their location. The significance of the indicator variables for HUD foreclosures might be
due to foreclosure per se or they may proxy the location of those properties.
The results of Exhibit 3 clear up some of the confusion in Exhibit 2. In Exhibit 3 the
indicator variable HUDNAB, which is coded 1 for HUD neighbors and coded 0 for HUD
properties, is replaced by HUDNAB2, which equals the sum of HUD and HUDNAB.
That is, HUDNAB2 is coded as 1 for properties that are either HUD foreclosed or in close
proximity to HUD-foreclosed properties. Similarly, BANKNAB2 is coded as 1 for both
bank foreclosures and their neighbors. This substitution allows the interpretation of the
coefficient on HUD (and BANK) as reflecting the effect of foreclosure alone and not the
effect of the location of the foreclosed property. In all cases the coefficient of the
HUDNAB2 is statistically significant, while the coefficient on HUD is statistically
insignificant. Once we have controlled for the location of HUD properties, foreclosure, 
by itself, has no significant impact on property values. In the linear model, HUD
foreclosures sell at an average discount of only $1,700, compared to the significant
discount of $7,300 for HUD neighborhood properties (including HUD foreclosures).
Introduction of the dummy variables for zip codes9 reduces the neighborhood effect of
$4,600. In the log-linear model without zip code dummies, houses in HUD neighbor-
hoods sell for 11.58% less than houses with the same characteristics, while HUD
foreclosures sell for an additional 8.38% discount. Introducing the zip code dummies
reduces the discount on properties in HUD neighborhoods to 8.31%, with HUD fore-
closures selling for a mere .17% less than other neighborhood properties.
This finding reinforces previous studies that found the housing market to be reasonably
efficient. That HUD foreclosures and their neighbors both sell for significantly less than
non-foreclosed properties has to do with their hidden characteristics—most likely the
characteristics of their shared neighborhoods. This implies that buying a HUD foreclosed
property would require expensive repairs and/or restoration before the house could be
resold at a higher price. Purchase and resale of HUD foreclosures would return about
one-sixth of 1% of their potential value. This is hardly a lucrative arbitrage prospect.
Conclusion
Forgey et al. (1994) purport to show that ‘‘foreclosure sales’’ result in a substantial
(23%) discount on the residential selling price. To do so they investigated a large sample
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of properties sold through the multiple listing service in Arlington, Texas. It is unclear
from their article whether these ‘‘foreclosure sales’’ represent hurried sales by irrational
sellers with positive equity attempting to beat an impending foreclosure date, or sales by
HUD, banks, or other owners of property whose owners actually defaulted. If fore-
closure, per se, results in such a large discount, we wonder why such properties were not
purchased long before they made the multiple listing service. If real estate professionals
handling these foreclosure sales do not recognize such profitable arbitrage prospects,
who would?
We believe that FRV’s findings are suspect because they inappropriately control for the
location characteristics of foreclosed (or soon-to-be-foreclosed) properties. Treating zip
codes and numerical map designations as cardinal, continuous numbers fail to adequately
control for the location characteristics of foreclosed properties. We have shown that
treating zip codes as a set of nominal (dummy) variables results in a substantial reduction
in the apparent discount for foreclosed properties. A dummy variable designating houses
in close proximity of foreclosed properties is consistently significant in both the linear and
log-linear models, with and without zip codes included in the regression. When the
variable is recoded to include foreclosed properties themselves (which are obviously in
their own neighborhood), we find that the dummy variable for HUD foreclosures becomes
insignificant, as the dummy variable for BANK foreclosures always is. We must conclude
that foreclosed properties sell for lower prices because of hidden defects (leading to
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Exhibit 3
Regressions: Foreclosured and Neighborhood Properties Combined
Linear Regressions Log-Linear Regressions
Dependent Variable: RPRICE Dependent Variable: ln (RPRICE)
Variable Coeff. T-Stat. Coeff. T-Stat. Coeff. T-Stat. Coeff. T-Stat.
Intercept 6978.53 1.42 23297.49 2.17 6.6540 24.13 7.1717 17.58
AGE 2548.52 211.77 2393.84 27.14 2.0097 213.06 2.0068 27.90
BATH 4439.44 2.96 4153.83 2.77 .0808 3.39 .0602 2.58
BR 26253.35 28.42 25008.92 26.65 2.0573 24.63 2.0258 22.08
FP 6176.71 6.38 5562.18 5.76 .1271 8.11 .1064 6.95
FL 25323.03 24.26 25309.94 24.30 2.0536 22.68 2.0568 22.92
GAR 3632.94 5.25 3321.83 4.92 .0345 3.10 .0248 2.32
MR 2578.68 6.11 2670.04 6.53 .0416 6.18 .0421 6.57
SQFT* 39.76 28.44 36.90 26.18 .5744 13.83 .4788 11.59
POOL 9610.68 6.66 9417.36 6.67 .1527 6.66 .1338 6.07
SLAB 2680.79 2.47 2742.47 2.53 2.0212 2.93 2.0282 21.28
BANK 3486.03 .62 5675.16 1.05 .1181 1.31 .1464 1.72
BANKNAB2 25744.24 21.70 27426.37 22.19 2.0071 2.36 2.0868 21.63
HUD 21699.35 21.39 21693.02 21.44 2.0875 21.62 2.0017 2.09
HUDNAB2 27343.82 26.41 24591.49 24.01 2.1231 26.75 2.0868 24.84
ZIP F 5 6.44 F 5 8.81
R2 .6588 .6908 .5326 .5905
Adjusted R2 .6564 .6836 .5292 .5810
F-statistic 270.23 95.74 159.42 61.79
Observations 1974 1974 1974 1974
*SQFT entered as natural logarithm in log-linear regression
negative equity when discovered) or due to neighborhood characteristics. Arbitrage
possibilities appear to be unattainable in the efficient market sense. 
Notes
1There are two reasons why foreclosure would occur: (1) the owner has negative equity—the market
price is less than the loan balance, or (2) the owner has positive equity but places the property on
the market too late to achieve the optimal price. The second case presents arbitrage profits, the first
does not.
2FRV conclude their paper with an irrelevant discussion of multicollinearity, when their main
problem is misspecification due to omitted variables and treating nominal variables as cardinal
ones. One cannot control for location by calculating a slope coefficient for zip code, as if places with
higher zip code values had ‘‘more location’’.
3Our data does not report the actual interest rate paid by the buyer, so we used the monthly average
rate for new mortgages, obtained from Citibase Macroeconomic Data Base.
4Deflating the sales price removes the effect of housing inflation (measured by the housing CPI)
from the price appreciation effect of time.
5Using the logarithm for square feet allows the coefficient to be interpreted as the elasticity of price
with respect to building size.
6Neighbors of foreclosed properties were identified by sorting properties by address. All property
sales within one block of foreclosed properties were labeled as neighbors. Properties further than a
block from any foreclosed property were categorized as ‘‘market’’ properties.
7If BANK is coded as 1, or if BANKNAB is coded as 1, then BANKNAB2 is coded as 1.
BANKNAB2 is coded as zero only if both BANKNAB and BANK are coded as 0.
8The formula for the F-statistic is:
(SSEr2SSEu)  / (dfr2dfu)
F 5                                         ,
SSEu / dfu
where SSEr is the restricted sum of the squared errors, SSRu is the unrestricted sum of squared
errors, and df is the degrees of freedom in each equation, respectively.
9HUD foreclosures are heavily concentrated among the thirty-one zip codes. Two-thirds of the
HUD foreclosures are located in six zip codes, and three-fourths are located in ten zip codes. There
are six zip codes that contain no HUD foreclosures.
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